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THE CONTINUING NEED FOR BROKER-DEALER
PROFESSIONALISM IN IPOS
JAMES FANTO*
In this essay, I contend that the IPO process and its abuses
of the late 1990s reveal a fundamental problem in the
brokerage industry. The abuses reveal the culmination of a
concerted training in business, business schools, and even
law schools and, more generally, in society. the acceptance
of self-interested profit maximization as the sole goal for
business and financial activities. I first review the IPO
abuses from the perspective of individual self-interest and
the group enhancement of it to show the fundamental
motivation of the abuses. I then examine the regulatory
responses to these abuses in order to point out their
incompleteness. I argue that the reforms were incomplete
because they established limited broker-dealer
professionalism, focusing only on research analysts, which
perversely encouraged those not directly touched to continue
to engage in selfinterested conduct. I also contend that this
absence of full broker-dealer professionalism can lead to
reputational risk that threatens these financial institutions
and even the stability of the securities markets. I thus
suggest that the professional reform for broker-dealers must
be wide-ranging and must reach into the training of future
bankers and brokers in the business schools. However, I
also offer a practical, stopgap reform suggestion that can
help alleviate reputational risk.
I. INTRODUCTION: IPO ABUSES AND BROKER-DEALERS
There were abuses in the initial public offering ("IPO") process by
broker-dealers, and they occurred particularly during the late 1990s before
the bursting of the NASDAQ "bubble." The abuses were often based upon
the underpricing of IPOs. IPO underpricing is a longstanding phenomenon,
which was exacerbated during the bubble years.1 It means that an IPO is
* Professor, Brooklyn Law School. © All rights reserved. I thank all the participants in
the symposium and my colleague at Brooklyn Law School, Arthur Pinto, for their
comments on this essay.
1 See Peter Oh, The Dutch Auction Myth, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 853 (2007)
(pointing out that underpricing was particularly significant during the last years of the
bubble). See id at 15 (citing finance data). In reviewing the finance literature on
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often priced at a considerable discount to its "true" value, which is
understood to be represented by its closing price on its first day of trading.
If there is underpricing, anyone who receives an allotment of IPO shares
obtains a considerable, even spectacular, gain in the first hours or days of
trading. As is well known, during the IPO bubble certain abuses based on
this underpricing occurred. IPO shares were allotted to favored investors,
often executives with whom a broker-dealer wanted to do business, in a
practice known as "spinning." In return for an allotment, investors were
asked to purchase other offered securities in the aftermarket to ensure the
offering's success (known as "laddering"), or to return profits to the broker-
dealer firms through excessive commissions on other trades. Sell-side
analysts (that is, those working for broker-dealers rather than for investors)
were urged and rewarded to promote an IPO by promising to support later
the subsequent trading in the shares of the IPO company through the
issuance of favorable research reports. The abuses were exacerbated in the
bubble environment fostered by the Internet, which facilitated the diffusion
of information about the IPO companies (often themselves companies with
Internet-based business) and individual stock trading. As is also well
known, many of these abuses were specifically addressed through changes
to rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and self-
regulatory organizations ("SROs"), as a result of the Global Settlement with
investment banks, and because of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation.
An important question is whether these IPO abuses, so exacerbated
in the bubble, were an aberration in an otherwise properly functioning
process, or something more. How one answers this question, I suspect,
determines one's approach to the IPO abuses. It certainly makes sense to
assume, as some do on the basis of the performance of the U.S. economy
and its capital markets and of a belief in the inherent strengths of the market
system, that the IPO process is basically a rational and well-functioning
method of raising and allocating capital. Since it is a human process, there
are always imperfections that need to be addressed, and one can make a
strong case that they should be identified by empirical examination, not
simply by anecdotal evidence cited by the media and politicians. This is the
approach of many financial economists, legal and financial practitioners,
and regulators, such as the New York Stock Exchange/NASDAQ
("NYSE/NASD") IPO Advisory Committee.2 Proponents of this position
underpricing and underwriter activity in IPOs, Professor Peter Oh cautions against
simplistic explanations, pointing out that there are rational explanations for the
phenomenon, e.g., underwriters underprice because they need to guarantee the success
of the offering, to minimize their liability under Section 11 of the Securities Act, and to
compensate institutional investors who provide them with pricing information and
repeat customers.
2 NYSE/NASD IPO ADVISORY COMMITTEE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF A
COMMITTEE CONVENED BY THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC. AND NASD AT THE
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would assert that after the IPO abuses, and particularly given advances in
information technology (especially the Internet), there is no reason to go
back to business as usual with broker-dealers. 3 The appeal of this position
is that it does not regard the status quo in IPOs as a good state of affairs,
since on this view broker-dealers use the current practice of price
determination to benefit themselves at the expense of companies and certain
(generally retail) investors. €
My concern with the IPO abuses is somewhat different from the
above perspectives and is similar to my approach to the major corporate
scandals of 2001-2002. 5 I contend that the IPO process and its abuses
reveal a fundamental problem in the brokerage industry.6 I argue that the
abuses reveal the culmination of a concerted training in business, business
schools, law schools,and in society generally: the acceptance of self-
interested profit maximization as the goal for business and financial
activities.7 I argue that, at a moment in time, through a confluence of
circumstances, this training came to fruition in a setting where its
REQUEST OF THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 3 (May 2003)
[hereinafter NYSE/NASD IPO ADVISORY COMMITTEE].
3 See, e.g., Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering, 26 CARDOZO
L. REV. 711, 787-90 (2005).
4 But see Ravi Jagannathan & Ann Sherman, Why Do IPO Auctions Fail? (Oct. 15,
2006), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract-874344 (for a defense of the
traditional U.S. method of broker-dealer involvement in and pricing of IPOs, known as
bookbuilding). In bookbuilding, the managing underwriter shops the IPO to favored
investors, usually institutional investors, to solicit their interest in the offering and from
the expressions of interest determines the offering price. Their argument is that the
other main method of determining the IPO price, through an auction, does not work,
because there is too much uncertainty in the process (i.e., in the number and
sophistication of potential investors). They argue that bookbuilding is necessary
because it identifies sophisticated investors and compensates them for their willingness
to invest in a relatively new company and because it effectively removes
unsophisticated investors, who only "free ride" on the sophisticated, from the process.
See also Frangois Derrien & Ambrus Kecsk~s, The Initial Public Offering of Listed
Firms, 62 J. FIN. 447 (2007) (for an interesting suggestion about another IPO alternative
from U.K. practice, which involves a listing of a firm's shares and then a subsequent
IPO).
5 James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering Corporate Inner
Circles, 83 OR. L.REv. 435 (2004).
' See NYSE/NASD IPO ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 4 (indicating from the
bubble years a systematic problem in the IPO process).
7 See, e.g., Herbert Gintis & Rakesh Khurana, Corporate Honesty andBusiness
Education: A Behavioral Model 2 (June 29, 2006), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract-929173 ("Neoclassical economic theory thus creates a
corporate atmosphere that legitimizes a culture of greed in which managers are
encouraged to care about nothing but personal gain, and in which such character virtues
as honesty, trustworthiness, and fairness are deployed only contingently in the interests
of personal material reward.").
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participants, particularly, although not exclusively, investment bankers and
broker-dealers, had considerable professional discretion in the IPO process.
The discretion, which may make sense in pricing IPOs in a situation of less
than complete information about the value of the IPO company, was used
by the participants to enrich themselves, without professional, moral, or
other norms to restrain them.' That is, the participants came to believe that
only the material consequences to themselves and their colleagues, and
perhaps to their families, mattered, and they had little regard for their
organizations, the marketplace, and the economy.9 Public outrage and legal
and market reforms ensued, but in time the abuses have been forgotten and
the reforms have been scaled back or not implemented. My concern is that,
if something fundamentally has changed in the "world view" of financial
participants, it is a mistake to return to business as usual, or even to reform
the IPO process only in a technocratic way, for the abuses are likely to
recur, albeit in a different form.
Indeed, I would even caution against focusing too much on, or
giving exclusive attention to, IPO abuses, for the important point is that
unrestrained self-interest may break out elsewhere in the future, or is
breaking out elsewhere in the financial industry now. It sounds almost
quaint today to discuss IPO abuses when the current financial abuses may
involve the financial engineering used in buying and reselling companies,
which may include an IPO, but where the abuses may involve low-priced
purchases of public companies, management participation in buyouts,
subsequent draining of assets from the firms, and then IPOs of weak
firms. 10 Wall Street, which consists of, among others, some of the best
college graduates who have been trained based on self-interested profit
maximization, can be highly inventive in benefiting its participants.
My basic concern connects indirectly to the purpose of this
symposium, which is the promotion of entrepreneurial activity through the
Internet, including using the Internet for IPOs. I am concerned that the
8 Cf NYSE/NASD IPO ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 19 (recognizing the
importance of professional obligations insofar as the committee recommends an
enhancement to professional behavior of investment banking teams involved in IPOs
and more emphasis upon it in broker-dealer examinations).
9 See Gintis & Khurana supra note 9, at 21 ("[B]y abjuring professional standards for
managers in favor of a culture of greed, it is likely that business schools that have
promoted the neoclassical model of stockholder-manager relations have so undercut the
culture of professional honor among managerial personnel that the mechanism of
informal third-party punishment and reward has sunk to dramatically low levels, thus
contributing to a deficit in moral behavior on the part of contemporary managerial
personnel.").
'0 See Jerry Cao & Josh Lerner, The Performance of Reverse Leveraged Buyouts (Oct.
15, 2006), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract-937801 (presenting criticisms of
the current "going private" wave, but finding that the performance of firms subject to a
Leveraged Buy-Out ("LBO") and then taken public was better than comparable firms
doing IPOs).
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dominance of unrestrained self-interest, together with investor losses, may
have consequences that are difficult to measure, but which may be
significant: there are large profits for the financial industry, but also the
creation of a generation of investors suspicious of the securities markets and
investment in public companies despite the ease, made possible by the
Internet, of investing in these companies' IPOs. This consequence
perversely reaffirms the self-interest perspective even in those harmed by it,
in much the same way that children are told to take before someone takes
from them. As an analogy, it is like global warming, which has also been
produced by short-term human self-interest: the consequences of an
excessive self-interested short-term focus are ignored, but then appear
rapidly with extremely destructive force.'' To respond to this self-interest
phenomenon and its effects will thus take more than technical adjustments
to the IPO process, although I shall try to offer one concrete proposal in
Section IV.
The essay is structured as follows: in Section iii review the IPO
abuses from the perspective of individual self-interest and the group
enhancement of it to show the fundamental motivation of the abuses; I then
examine the regulatory responses to these abuses in Section i1. My
intention there is not to comprehensively review the reforms, but to point
out their incompleteness and to set the stage for my basic argument. This
argument comes in Section IV, where I argue that the reforms were
incomplete because they established only limited broker-dealer
professionalism, focusing only on research analysts, which perversely
encouraged those not directly touched to continue to engage in self-
interested conduct. I also contend in Section IV that this absence of full
broker-dealer professionalism can lead to reputational risk that threatens
these financial institutions and even the stability of the securities markets. I
suggest that the professional reform for broker-dealers must be wide-
ranging and must reach into the training of future bankers and brokers in the
business schools. However, I also offer a practical, stopgap reform
suggestion that can help alleviate reputational risk. I conclude in Section V.
II. THE CENTRALITY OF INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP SELF-
INTEREST IN THE IPO ABUSES
In this section, I argue that the IPO abuses were understandable if
one considers that the IPO participants were motivated primarily by
individual and group self-interest (narrowly defined as the promotion of the
welfare of each group member). In other words, the abuses were "over-
determined" by self-interest and enhanced by group processes and
motivations. The individual and group motivations were so powerful that,
' See EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE FUTURE OF LIFE 42-78 (2002).
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once activated, they created a bandwagon effect for completion of the IPO
and for participation in the abuses. Here, I review the self-interest of each
of the participants and the group enhancement below to emphasize how
powerful they are, and thus how difficult it is for social and organizational
processes to counteract them. Moreover, I argue that because of the
centrality of the broker-dealer in the IPO, the self-interested conduct of the
bankers, analysts, and brokers working for the broker-dealer sends a
message to the other IPO participants that this is the acceptable behavioral
norm for the process.
Let me summarily review the IPO process from the perspective of
the self-interest of each of its participants. I contend that both their training
and the financial culture guide their conduct on the basis of self-interest.
1 2
The executives and the directors of an IPO company (also known as an
"issuer" of the securities) want the IPO for all kinds of justifiable reasons
that financial economists have long explored and documented. For
example, the IPO signals that in a competitive market the firm is moving to
the next stage of its development, and the IPO gives the firm competitive
advantages, such as funds to make significant investments and public stock
as acquisition currency. 3  Naturally, the self-interest of directors and
officers is also tied up with the iPO's success. They would individually
value the possibility of cashing out their shares either in the IPO or into a
secondary securities market that is created following a successful IPO. This
latter sale is available to them once the lockup expires. 14 This may be a
12 These self-interest motivations are spelled out at length in "insider" views of financial
services. See, e.g., PHILIP AUGAR, THE GREED MERCHANTS: How THE INVESTMENT
BANKS PLAYED THE FREE MARKET GAME (2005).
13 See Jagannathan & Sherman, supra note 4, at 13 (emphasizing that executives have
many reasons for IPOs and that obtaining the most proceeds is not their highest priority;
rather, executives care about the success of the IPO for the long-term success of the
firm, which means gaining an analyst following and institutional investors as buyers).
For a survey of the literature on why companies conduct IPOs, see Jay R. Ritter & Ivo
Welch, A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and Allocations, 57 J. FIN. 1795, 1796-1800
(2002). For a recent article surveying the views of CFOs regarding the IPO process, see
James C. Brau & Stanley E. Fawcett, Initial Public Qfferings: An Analysis of Theory
and Practice, 61 J. FIN. 399, 400 (2006) (finding that CFOs do an IPO primarily to
create public shares for acquisitions, that they select underwriters based on reputation,
research, and expertise, and that they feel underpricing is a cost of business to
compensate investors for risks). See also Sreedhar T. Bharath & Amy K. Dittmar, To
Be or Not to Be (Public) (Dec. 2006 draft), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstsract-951710 (finding that information and liquidity concerns
are the strongest factors in the decision to go and to remain public).
14 Generally, underwriters insist that officers and directors not sell their shares of the
company immediately after a public offering, for such sales would put selling pressure
on the aftermarket price and send a negative signal to the market. Accordingly,
insiders' shares are subject to a contractual "lock-up" of typically 180 days following
the offering. Cf Alexander Ljungqvist & William J. Wilhelm, Jr., Does Prospect
Theory Explain 1PO Market Behavior? (2004 draft), available at
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"once in a lifetime" opportunity for their enrichment. Moreover, although
the executives might not benefit from the IPO at the offering, their "friends
of the family" who receive allotments would, which could provide
additional satisfaction to the executives. 15 In addition, investment banks
typically promise executives and directors benefits following the offering,
such as shares in other hot IPOs, hedging services to protect their
continuing investment in the firm, and a high stock price through positive
research reports for their stock sales after the expiration of the lock-up.
The executives are of course not straw men and women; reasons
and emotions complement and even restrain their self-interest. For
example, they may be concerned that the company is proceeding too fast
out of the private capital market, and thus that the IPO may put the
company and its executives and directors in a precarious position if it does
not work out. There will likely be a reservation price below which they will
not do the offering. But the pressure to succeed in highly competitive
product markets, coupled with their self-interest, especially if it is
constantly appealed to by investment bankers (and media frenzy), may be
too great for the executives and directors to resist. Once they are committed
to a transaction, they will likely not be put off.
Existing shareholders of an IPO firm, particularly the venture
capital firms, also have a powerful self-interest to do the IPO, since they
would value the opportunity, at the time of the IPO or subsequently, to sell
off their stake in the firm. The main reason, in fact, for the investment of
many of these private investors in private companies is to profit from a sale
of the firm, preferably into the public markets, as this produces the greatest
returns to them. 16  Since venture firms are repeat players, from a self-
interest perspective they have reputational reasons to be careful about being
too self-interested in the IPO process. A venture capital firm would like to
be known as an investor in companies that are successful in the public
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract-571007 (explaining how IPO executives "anchor" on the
midrange price offered by the investment bankers, who give a range of the likely sales
price for the IPO, and then calculate how much they lost or gained in the IPO with
respect to their locked-up shares).
15 Professor Christine Hurt discusses these motivations for executives and directors.
See Christine Hurt, What Google Can't Tell Us About Internet Auctions (and What it
Can), 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 403, 409-10 (2006). "Friends of the family" or directed share
programs ("DSPs") are programs that allocate a portion of the offering to certain
groups, typically employees, directors, and sometimes officers, customers, and
suppliers of the issuer. These programs can be large (although there is no typical size).
It has been found that officer and director participation in DSPs does not result in more
underpricing, and that reputable underwriters discourage the use of such programs in
offerings. See generally Rina Ray, Directed Share Programs in IPO Undervriting and
Agency Problems (Dec. 1, 2006), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract-921675.
16 See INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 38
(Nov. 30, 2006) [hereinafter COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION].
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securities markets, and it would thus prefer to bring to market only high
quality firms (not "lemons"). Indeed, there is evidence that venture capital-
backed IPO firms were subject to fewer IPO abuses (i.e., they had less
underpricing), which might show that venture firms are more rational in the
IPO process and check their self-interest. 17 However, the lack of survival of
a venture capital-backed IPO company may not be immediate and, thus,
may not harm the reputation of the sponsoring venture capital firm. This
assumes that investors have short memories, the investor community
changes, and that the investors who matter (institutional investors) are not
hurt, because these institutions benefit from an IPO despite the IPO
company's later failure (i.e., they resell IPO shares soon into the
aftermarket). 18
The broker-dealer firms (i.e., the investment banks) are the main
gatekeepers to the public securities markets for IPO firms, 19 and they are
my primary concern here. Not only did they engineer many of the IPO
abuses (just as they participated in the abuses in the corporate scandals), but
their behavior sent a signal to all the IPO participants (as well as to the
public) that self-interest was the order of the day. Not surprisingly, the self-
interest of the broker-dealer firms, their principals, and their employees
motivates them to find and to complete these transactions.2 0  An IPO
represents for the firm not only the fees for the transaction, which is the IPO
discount or difference between the investment bank's price paid for
purchasing the securities from the company and the price at which it resells
them to the public, but also the promise of future business from the
17 See generally C.N.V. Krishnan et al., Does Venture Capital Reputation Affect
Subsequent 1P0 Performance? (Oct. 31, 2006 draft), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-910982 (presenting data showing that IPO companies backed
by the most reputable venture capital firms (defined in terms of a firm's share of
venture capital-backed IPOs)-have the best long-term performance of IPOs).
18 Venture capitalists can also receive side-benefits from the bankers, for they, too, are
allocated shares of hot IPOs. See Jonathan Reuter, Are 1PO Allocations for Sale?
Evidence From Autual Funds, 61 J. FIN. 2289, 2323 (2006).
19 See Jagannathan & Sherman, supra note 4, at 36 (pointing out that an underwriter in
bookbuilding screens for knowledgeable investors and companies with potential, thus
ensuring the success of a process that is filled with uncertainty).
20 Some have cautioned about making blanket assumptions that broker-dealers are self-
interested to the point of being exploitative. In a survey of conflicts of interest in
financial institutions, Professor Rene Stulz and his co-authors find that the financial
economic evidence does not necessarily support the view that broker-dealers exploited
their customers, even in the bubble. See Rene Stulz et al., The Economics of Conflicts
of Interest in Financial Institutions (Fisher College of Business Working Paper Series,
No. 2006-03-005, Nov. 30, 2006), available at http://www.cob.ohio-
state.edu/fin/dice/papers/2006/2006-21.pdf. Moreover, the authors of this study
contend that some evidence (e.g., analysts keeping their ratings after an IPO, when the
stock has fallen in price) may in fact reflect not self-interest, but behavioral biases (e.g.,
over-optimism by the analysts and a refusal by them to admit that their valuation
models are wrong).
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company to the bank, such as follow-on offerings, mergers and acquisition
transactions, asset management and risk protection for executives and major
shareholders, 2 ' market making and commission income from trading, and
other proprietary trading activities. Even if an IPO firm proves to be
unsuccessful, the broker-dealer can profit from it before its ultimate demise.
As in the case of venture capital firms, the broker-dealer must be concerned
about its investors and the negative consequences of promoting firms that
eventually fail. But, as discussed below, it may be able to please the
investors who matter (such as those who receive allocations in "hot"
offerings, and the hedge funds that benefit from market fluctuations) and
may be indifferent to retail investors (who come and go, who are often
relegated to centralized services from broker-dealers, and who are little
more than a source of commission and fee income), and its trading profits
with respect to the company may outweigh any loss of business due to the
22dissatisfaction of (again, largely retail) investors. Moreover, as shown by
the late 1990s bubble, broker-dealers had various methods (many now
banned) of profiting from IPOs: requiring large investors to purchase shares
in the aftermarket in order to receive an IPO allotment, to direct
commissions to brokers on other trades (often at high rates), or to purchase
shares of "bad" IPOs in return for receiving an allotment in a "good" one.
2 3
Significantly, the individual investment bankers that look for and
execute IPO transactions have a strong self-interest in obtaining IPO
mandates and completing them. Their bonuses are determined by the
amount of business that they generate and complete; they generally do not
have to worry about the consequences of an IPO company that later fails
since they may no longer even work for that broker-dealer. In short, their
incentive is to do the deal and to move on to the next. Perhaps the best
example of this kind of motivation was Frank Quattrone and the members
of his former group with Credit Suisse.24 They were valued for the stream
of transactions that they could bring into any broker-dealer that would agree
to house them. In a similar way, sell-side analysts working for broker-
dealers had the same motivations as the bankers to promote the IPOs,
21 For example, the NYSE/NASD IPO Advisory Committee observed that underwriters
provide issuer executives and others subject to lockups with derivative contracts to
lock-in "virtual" IPO gains that they may have. See NYSE/NASD IPO ADVISORY
COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 17.
22 For a survey of why underwriters rationally underprice and how underwriters benefit
from IPO allocations, underpricing, and follow-on work, see Ritter & Welch, supra
note 13, at 1808-15.
23 See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 2006);
NYSE/NASD IPO ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 1-2.
24 Some background on Quattrone is provided in United States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d
153 (2d Cir. 2006) (overturning his criminal conviction). For a critical view on the
current culture of investment bankers, see JONATHAN A. KNEE, THE ACCIDENTAL
INVESTMENT BANKER 171-87 (2006).
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particularly when they were compensated in a similar manner.25 The
management of investment banks (with a longer term perspective on
profitability than the individual bankers) showed little effort to restrain
banker teams during the abuses, since they wanted to retain these good
producers and, like others in the firm, they shared in the profitability of the
iPOs.
Furthermore, certain investors had self-interested reasons for
investing in IPOs. They may invest in IPO securities, provided that they
can sell their shares at a significant profit into the market (or, of course, find
26
a profitable long-term IPO investment). These are the investors, typically
institutional investors, favored by the broker-dealer firms, 27 who were
invited to the oral roadshows and profited from IPO underpricing, even if
they had to share their profits with broker-dealers.2 8 These are generally the
money managers, whose relationships with broker-dealer firms are
complex: purchasing IPO shares is only one part.29 Again, these investors
25 This remark about the motivations of analysts echoes Professor Coffee's analysis of
them and other individual professionals in his book on "gatekeepers," where he
emphasizes that scandals often arose because the relationship banker, analyst, auditor,
or lawyer was motivated by self-interest only to complete transactions in order to please
the client and received little oversight from the supervisors in his or her firm. See JOHN
C. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 245-82
(2006). Regulation AC now bans the tying of analyst compensation to investment
banking success (yet their compensation remains connected to the firm's profitability).
See infra. See also Franqois Derrien, Currying Favor to Win 1PO Mandates (Dec. 5,
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-888204 (finding that favorable analyst
coverage of an IPO managed by another bank increases the chance that the analyst's
firm will be a co-manager in the next IPO managed by that bank, provided that both
banks are high status (which suggests that conflicts affect analysts with respect to
offerings of banks other than their own), and that positive coverage of the firm's own
managed IPOs increases the chance of receiving other IPO mandates, but this finding
applies only to less prestigious banks).
26 See Francesca Cornelli et al., Investor Sentiment and Pre-IPO Markets, 61 J. FIN.
1187, 1188-89 (2006) (contending that sophisticated institutional investors who receive
IPO allotments take advantage of the over-optimism of retail investors and smaller
institutions in reselling the IPO shares).
27 In other words, these are the institutional investors who do the most business with
broker-dealers, rewarding them with the highest commissions and fees. See Reuter,
supra note 20, at 2291 (finding that mutual funds that received hot IPOs did more
business with allocating broker-dealers than those funds that did not receive the IPOs).
28 Or (which is not exclusive of the first account) these may be rational arbitrageurs who
try to anticipate public sentiments in investing, rather than trying to "discipline" the
public through short selling. See ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 154-156 (2000).
29 On this point, one thinks of the soft dollar arrangements broker-dealers offer to
money managers and the services (not always legal) money managers provide to
broker-dealers (making indirect payments to broker-dealers in return for their directing
clients to the products of the money manager). See generally 1 NORMAN S. POSER &
JAMES A. FANTO, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION § 10-42 to § 10-67 (4 th ed.
2007).
2008] THE COATTINUIATG NEED FOR BROKER-DEALER 689
PROFESSIONALISM IN IPOS
must be contrasted with retail investors, who do not generally receive IPO
allotments (except for IPOs that are in trouble), but who can purchase the
IPO securities in the aftermarket, often in the speculative frenzy facilitated
by the ease of trading made possible by the Internet.
Under this account, the self-interest incentive structure of all the
parties (exacerbated by the broker-dealer as a kind of master of ceremonies
of the IPO) led to the IPO abuses. With self-interest acting as a baseline
motivation for the executives, the bankers, and others involved, group
motivations exacerbated the IPO abuses.3 ° I suggest that, as in almost all
human activity, the participants in the IPO form a group or "team" to
accomplish the transaction. Group processes and motivations reinforce and
magnify the individual motivations discussed above. Most significantly,
since all participants are motivated by self-interest to complete the IPO, the
group has a reason for forming and a readily provided justification for its
existence (i.e., that each participant will benefit greatly from this
transaction). Moreover, since the broker-dealer is at the center, and its
bankers are arguably the leaders of the groups and subgroups that form in
the IPO process, and since they are enhancing by their own example the
message of self-interest in the transaction, the groups become powerfully
cohesive.
In my view, the IPO abuses thus owed much to the formation and
strength of the deal groups or teams. If an IPO only involved disparate
individuals separately working for its completion, there would be more of a
chance that abuses would not have occurred. For example, if one
participant's motivations other than self-interest became stronger than the
self-interest, he or she might question the process. A deal group, however,
created a dynamic because it gives its participants a social identity, even if
one limited by the transaction, that makes it very difficult for a participant
not to go along with practices that are endorsed by the group and
particularly by its leaders (the practices are endorsed simply because "that
is the way things are done"). I refer here to the well-known characteristics
of groups (particularly cohesive groups with a specified mission) to
discourage (and to punish) dissent among their members and to create a
form of self-censorship whereby the group member accepts the group's
30 One could also assert that "quasi-rational" motivations also animated the participants.
These kinds of motivations are now fairly well-known and set forth in the behavioral
law and economics literature. They are essentially ways of thinking that are not entirely
rational, which strongly affect an individual's decision-making. To take only one
example: individual executives and bankers are likely to be overly optimistic that their
IPO will be particularly successful and will have results identical to those of well-
known IPOs, which are visible and well publicized, rather than the result of
unsuccessful iPOs, which are, in any case, not emphasized in the bubble environment.
See generally HERSH SHEFRIN, BEHAVIORAL CORPORATE FINANCE: DECISIONS THAT
CREATE VALUE 1-9 (2007).
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views, even if he or she knows them to be false or dishonest (this is often
referred to as "groupthink"). 31 These characteristics can lead individuals in
groups to participate in, often incrementally, or at least to turn a blind eye
to, what can be characterized as clearly improper and illegal practices (in
the IPO case, laddering and spinning). Groups can also exaggerate the
baseline motivation of their members (i.e., in this case, make participants
even more self-interested). I recognize that deal teams are transient and do
not mean to suggest that participants are completely captured by them. But
it would be a mistake to ignore their power, particularly if group goals
reinforce the motivations of members and the purposes of other groups to
which they belong.
III. SEC AND SRO PROPOSALS AND SOLUTIONS TO THE ABUSES
If one accepts the above account of an individual and social reality
that contributed to the IPO abuses and that can lead to new ones, it is
necessary to ask how to counter the self-interest of the participants, and the
group enhancement of it orchestrated by broker-dealers. It is certainly old
news that the SEC and the SROs, sometimes directed by Congress, did
what one expects from those in the real world: they addressed specific IPO
abuses by regulating the conduct of broker-dealers in the IPO process. The
current news or debate is whether, in this pragmatic regulation, Congress
and the regulators "over-regulated," for example, by addressing non-
existent abuses or imposing regulations the costs of which surpassed the
harm arising from the abuses.3 2 I review below several responses to the
IPO abuses and suggest that, for the understandable reason that the reforms
had a pragmatic focus, they did not address the underlying problem.
As is well known, the SROs, rather than the SEC, primarily
addressed the IPO abuses. The SRO reforms to the IPO process had several
origins: the findings of the NYSE/NASD IPO Advisory Committee, the
Global Settlement regarding securities analysts,33 and eventually the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. . Many of the recommendations of the
NYSE/NASD IPO Advisory Committee were technical and dealt with
specific abuses. Significantly, it recommended that a broker-dealer should
be prohibited from "spinning" shares to officers and directors of investment
banking clients, prospective clients, and money managers, as well as to
31 See generally IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY
DECISIONS AND FIASCOES 174-77 (2d ed. 1983); Fanto, supra note 6, at 460-72.
32 See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, supra note 16, at xiii.
33 See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Voluntary Initiative Regarding
Allocations of Securities in "Hot" Initial Public Offerings to Corporate Executives and
Directors (Apr. 28, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/globalvolinit.htm [hereinafter
Voluntary Initiative].
34 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley].
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political officials. 35  Moreover, it would prohibit broker-dealers from
selectively penalizing investors (i.e., retail, but not institutional) who
"flipped" (i.e., immediately resold) IPO shares, 36 would ban the entry of
unpriced orders on the first day of IPO trading (which could add to the IPO
frenzy), 3 and would not allow the managing underwriter discretion in
selling any returned shares of "hot" IPOs. 38  The Committee also
recommended that the issuer's DSPs be limited to 5% of the offering (so as
to restrain "friends and family" abuses in IPOs), that DSP shares be subject
to the lock-up, and that more information about these DSPs be disclosed in
the IPO prospectus, as well as that there be more disclosure about lock-ups,
exceptions to lock-ups, and derivative contracts by the banks to protect
39individuals whose shares are locked up.
The NASD (the primary SRO for broker-dealers, which has been
recently renamed the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority or "FINRA")
took action on many of these recommendations and explained that certain
problematic broker-dealer misbehavior was prohibited under its existing
rules. Spinning IPO shares to money managers was addressed by NASD
Rule 2790, which was promulgated in 2004 and which replaced a
longstanding NASD interpretation of its rules addressing similar practices.4 °
By contrast, spinning IPO shares to officers and directors of clients would
be prohibited by proposed NASD Rule 2712, which has not been
finalized.4' In the meantime, the Global Research Analyst Settlement
addressed this kind of spinning (at least until 2008, when it expires). 42
NASD Rule 3060 arguably prohibits the practice as well, since it disallows
a broker-dealer or an "associated person" of the broker-dealer from giving
43
anything of value in excess of $100 to a client for business purposes.
Indeed, proposed NASD Rule 2712 would deal with many of the
IPO abuses identified by the NYSE/NASD IPO Advisory Committee. It
bans "quid pro quo" arrangements (i.e., brokers allotting IPO shares in
return for excessive commissions on other trades), although the practice is
arguably covered by NASD Rule 2330(f), which prohibits a broker-dealer
35 See NYSE/NASD IPO ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 10-11.
36 See id. at 7.
37 See id at 6.
38 See id. at 7-8.
39 See id at 13, 16-18. The Committee also offered other recommendations, such as
SEC rules be changed to permit broader public access to the broker-dealers' roadshows
(an approach later adopted by the SEC) and that there be more investor education about
IPOs. See id. at 14-15, 19-20.
40 See NASD RULE 2790(a)(1); NASD NOTICE TO MEMBERS 03-79,
http://finra.complinet.com/nasd/display/index.html (online NASD Manual).
41 NASD RULE 2712(b) (Proposed 2003); SR-NASD-140 (Dec. 9, 2003).
42 See Voluntary Initiative supra note 35.
4, See NASD RULE 3060(a).
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from sharing profits with a customer.4 4 It prohibits selective imposition of
penalties upon associated persons of broker-dealers if their customers have
flipped IPO shares where no penalty bid has been imposed on the broker-
dealer itself.45 "Laddering" was initially addressed in Rule 2712, but this
proposal was later dropped due to the industry's concern about the
difficulty of enforcing it.46 In any event, the practice is likely covered by
Rule 101 of SEC Regulation M, which prohibits price manipulation in a
securities offering. 47 Moreover, laddering is addressed indirectly insofar as
the proposed Rule, following upon the Committee's recommendation,
would ban market orders for one trading day following an IPO. 48 In
addition, the proposed Rule addresses the situation where IPO securities are
returned to the managing underwriter, who would not be able to allot them
to favored clients but would have to sell the securities on the market and
return the difference, if any, between a higher market price and the offering
price to the issuer.49
A potential solution to the bandwagon group effect that magnifies
the self-interest of individual IPO participants is to have someone, an
outsider, oversee the IPO process, with the understanding that the outsider
would be independent enough to prevent him or her from being drawn into
the IPO group's dynamic and would particularly oversee the broker-dealer's
involvement. The outsider, however, would have the necessary authority so
that participants could not ignore his or her views. The NYSE/NASD IPO
Advisory Committee made a suggestion in line with this approach when it
proposed giving the independent directors on the issuer's board a greater
role in the IPO process and pricing.5° Proposed NASD Rule 2712 would
also require the managing underwriter to give the pricing committee of the
board of directors (or the entire board in the absence of this committee)
information about the results of the bookbuilding and final allocations in the
offering.5' Under the proposed Rule, the managing underwriter would have
to notify the board and to make a public announcement about any waiver of
a lock-up pertaining to insiders' sales of shares and to make sure that the
lock-up applies to any shares that the issuer directs to insiders in the
offering.5 2
I shall have more to say below about this involvement of the IPO
issuer's board of directors in the IPO process. Yet I am skeptical about how
44 See NASD RULE 2712(a) (Proposed 2003); NASD RULE 2330(f).
45 See NASD RULE 2712(d) (Proposed 2003).
46 See SR-NASD-2003-140 (Dec. 9, 2003), Amendment 1, available at
http://www.sec.gov.
47 See 17 C.F.R. § 242.101(a) (2007).
48 NASD RULE 2712(e)(3) (Proposed 2003).
49 id.
50 See NYSE/NASD IPO ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 4-5.
51 NASD RULE 2712(e)(1) (Proposed 2003).
52 NASD RULE 2712(e)(3) (Proposed 2003).
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more involvement of the board in pricing and allocation will actually
improve the IPO process, especially given the inadequate performance of
independent directors in matters closer to their area of competence, such as
corporate governance. Moreover, not only are directors affected by self-
interest since they typically receive allocations in DSPs, but they are
generally unlikely to have the kind of knowledge to be able to deal
effectively with the investment bankers. A related reform is the
engagement of an independent underwriter to be involved in IPO pricing.
53
One can also question how effective the use of an independent underwriter
will be to counter IPO abuses. Since the "independent" broker-dealer is
likely to be engaging in them in its own underwriting, it will not want to
have a reputation of being uncooperative as to other banks' iPOs if it hopes
to attract future IPO business, including being a co-manager with other
broker-dealers on transactions.
It is important to mention the regulation of research analysts in the
IPO reforms, especially since they were held to have had such a large
influence upon the retail investors' purchase of IPO shares in the
aftermarket. This is an enormous topic, but it is important for my later
discussion. In Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress added Section 15D to the
Exchange Act that directed the SEC itself or through the SROs to
implement rules addressing research analysts' conflicts of interest with
respect to equity securities.54 The purpose of this part of the legislation is to
separate research analysts from investment bankers, in an attempt to
insulate them from the bankers' pressure. It also added to the SEC and
SRO regulation of research analysts that had already occurred by the time
of the enactment of the legislation (spurred by the New York Attorney
General's investigation of the analysts). As is well known, the SEC
promulgated Regulation AC, which requires, among other things,
certification by an analyst as to his or her belief in the research
recommendation.5 Again, regulation of research analysts is indirectly
relevant to the IPO abuses, for broker-dealers win IPO mandates partly by
promising favorable subsequent coverage by their analysts (and having
analysts themselves promise such to obtain the IPO mandate). Moreover,
as noted earlier, favorable analyst coverage of the issuer can particularly
help insiders for, right before the expiration of the lock-up, the analyst can
release a favorable research report on the company (known as a "booster
shot").
53 This is similar to the current situation where a qualified independent underwriter is
required for pricing when a broker-dealer is underwriting its own securities or those of
an affiliate. See NASD RULE 2720.
54 See Sarbanes-Oxley § 501 (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6).
55 See Regulation Analyst Certification, Securities Act Release No. 8193, 68 Fed. Reg.
9482 (Feb. 27, 2003), 17 C.F.R. pt. 242.
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Among other things, the relevant SRO rules separate analysts from
investment banking and, indeed, from the IPO process in a number of ways.
They prohibit an investment banker from supervising a research analyst,
determining his or her compensation, retaliating for an analyst's research
report or public appearance, and reviewing his or her research report prior
to its publication.56 With respect to the IPO process, the rules prohibit
broker-dealers from offering a company favorable research in return for the
mandate. They also prohibit research analysts from marketing a transaction
(analysts can discuss pricing information with investment bankers after a
mandate is received), from soliciting business from an issuer (although
analysts can participate in company due diligence after a mandate is
received), and from participating in road shows or speaking to investors
with company executives and investment bankers (analysts can talk with
investors separately and educate the broker-dealer's sales force once the
broker-dealer has the mandate, provided that their discussion is
"balanced"). 57 An analyst's compensation cannot be based upon specific
transactions or on evaluations of investment bankers. 58
In addition, under SRO rules, an investment bank that manages or
participates in an offering may not immediately publish a research report, or
have an analyst make a public appearance, following the offering date
(except for a report that relates to significant news or a significant event
about to the company, which would generally trigger a company's Form 8-
K filing).5 9 There is also a blackout period for analyst research reports and
public appearances of analysts (but only pertaining to broker-dealers that
managed or co-managed the offering) around the expiration, waiver, or
termination of a lock-up of insiders' shares by the broker-dealer (also
subject to the significant news or event exception). 60 Research analysts also
have restrictions on their personal trading: an analyst is not allowed to
purchase securities of private companies in the same line of business as that
covered by the analyst; there is a blackout period for purchases or sales of
company securities by the analyst around the release of a research report;
and the analyst is prohibited from trading against his or her
56 See NYSE RULE 472(b); NASD RULE 2711. See also Self-Regulatory Organizations,
Exchange Act Release No. 55,072, 72 Fed. Reg. 2058 (Jan. 17, 2007).
57 See NYSE RULE 472(b)(5), (6); NASD RULE 271 1(c).
58 See NYSE RULE 472(h); NASD RULE 2711 (d).
59 For a manager or co-manager, the cooling off period for a research report and a public
appearance by a research analyst is 40 days; for a member of the underwriting syndicate
the period is 25 days. See NYSE RULE 472(f)(1)&(3); NASD RULE 2711(f)(1) & (2).
60 The blackout period is fifteen days before and five after the event. See NYSE RULE
472(f)(4); NASD RULE 271 1(f)(4). The NASD would eliminate this period, and the
NYSE would reduce it to five days before and after and broaden the exceptions to
include earnings announcements. See 72 Fed. Reg. at 2070, 2075.
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recommendation in the report. 61 Detailed disclosure about conflicts of
interest of analysts and broker-dealers must be placed in research reports.
62
IV. NEED FOR BROKER-DEALER PROFESSIONALISM
My recommendation with respect to the IPO abuses is both general
and specific. It is based upon a view that the most significant reform must
come from the management and employees of broker-dealers themselves.
Certainly, the SEC and the SROs have a significant role in the process, and
they have already taken important actions, as described above, to address
some IPO abuses. Yet they do not have the resources to oversee the
behavior of broker-dealers in IPOs. Moreover, even SEC Commissioners
and staff members, as well as SRO regulatory personnel, who are without
doubt dedicated people, may not always pursue fundamental reforms
vigorously because they suffer from conflicts of interest. Given the
constant movement of individuals between the SEC and broker-dealers,
these regulators cannot be seen as being unaccommodating to the industry
that they regulate and that may be their source of future employment.
63
My basic point is that the technical reforms skirt around the
fundamental problem of dealing with self-interest and, even at times,
exacerbate it in a perverse way. Certainly, it makes sense to prohibit
spinning, laddering, and kick-backs of IPO proceeds to broker-dealers and
to separate research analysts from investment bankers. It is a natural and
logical move for regulators and industry members to ban an unfair, abusive
practice. It is especially logical when the recommendation comes from, or
is acknowledged by, industry insiders, who understand the most flagrant
abuses in financial practice. But this represents only the first step in any
reform. A good example of the incompleteness of the reforms is the
regulation of research analysts in broker-dealers, as discussed above. The
research analyst is now walled-off from investment banking and told to be
true to his or her ideals of objectivity as to the proper evaluation of
companies. In a sense, an analyst is asked to be a professional, rather than a
self-interested salesperson. That is, he or she is to base his or her conduct
in the securities market upon fidelity to methods of analysis and standards
of knowledge and to be honest in his or her actions and language. But the
unstated assumption of imposing the wall around the research analyst and
61 See NYSE RULE 472(e); NASD RULE 2711 (g). These restrictions are subject to
detailed exceptions.
62 See NYSE RULE 472(k); NASD RULE 2711 (h). This disclosure can be placed on the
broker-dealer's web site, to which it can be referred or hyperlinked in the research
report.
63 This is an old point made in scholarly literature about regulatory agencies such as the
SEC. See SUSAN M. PHILLIPS & J. RICHARD ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 22-24 (1981).
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elevating his or her standard of conduct is that those outside the wall are not
held to the same professional ideals and standards.
In other words, investment bankers are free to act in a self-
interested way to seek IPO mandates and to complete transactions.
Similarly, the brokers in the sales force who, despite their current
professional-sounding name, "financial advisors," are also not directed to
be professionals and are allowed to focus only on selling the broker-dealer's
products and generating commission or fee income. It is as if the brokerage
industry actually agreed to make its "public face" (now so widely available
over the Internet) professional, but declined to make its most productive
employees assume the same status. It is true that, as discussed above, the
investment bankers are now prohibited from engaging in some of their
former practices, such as spinning IPO shares to company officials. But
they have not been asked, as have the research analysts, to act as
professionals in all circumstances, which would mean scrupulously
avoiding conflicts of interest in their conduct and attempting to be as
objective as possible in their advice and recommendations. For example, a
relationship banker does not have to certify that an IPO is, in his or her
belief, in the best interests of the company, or that the IPO price is, in his or
her professional judgment, the highest possible in the market.64 They have
not been asked to reform their fundamental behavior, and therefore other
abuses by them are likely to occur even if we cannot anticipate their form
now. Indeed, executives of broker-dealers and the investment bankers
themselves can even believe that, since the firm has a public professional
conscience in the research analysts, and since firms engage in extensive
disclosure of conflicts of interest (placed for all to see on the Internet), the
bankers and brokers are free to be self-serving in their business conduct.6 5
The problem thus needs a solution beyond the reforms addressing
specific IPO abuses. It is the kind of problem that is endemic to any
profession, particularly one that takes place in the large, complex
institutions that are broker-dealers-the conflict between profits and ideals.
Broker-dealers must recognize that, if unaddressed, the abusive behavior of
their most productive employees poses a significant risk to them. In
financial regulatory terms, the risk here is the "reputational" risk that a
broker-dealer (or any financial institution) may incur from its employees'
abusive and exploitative practices. Professor Ingo Walter defines
"reputational risk" as losses due to management processes related to the
64 Under NASD RULE 2110, a securities professional has only the general mandate to
"observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of
trade."
6' A related point has been made by psychologists and organizational theorists when
they observe that disclosure of conflicts of interest may actually liberate those making
the disclosure to act in a self-serving manner. See Daylian M. Cain et al., The Dirt on
Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts qf Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD.
1, 3-4 (2005).
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following factors: "[r]eputational risk in turn is related to the strategic
positioning and execution of the firm, conflicts of interest exploitation,
individual professional conduct, compliance and incentive systems,
leadership, and the prevailing corporate culture. 66 He discusses how a firm
incurs the risk because misbehavior by the firm's employees activates and
catalyzes social values in prosecutors and regulators, who are spurred into
action and who seek to punish the firm for this misbehavior. But these
social values that are activated are particularly difficult to identify, and it is
also hard to know when they will be triggered. And the broker-dealer
always balances this risk against the profitability and the success of the
firm. In his view, reputational risk particularly arises from the existence of
conflicts of interest in financial conglomerates where cross-selling is
encouraged, but where the financial institution's interests are opposed to
those of its clients, or it is faced with the situation of having to favor certain
clients over others.67 For him, these conflicts pose a significant reputational
risk as well as extreme compliance costs.
68
Reputational risk presents very real dangers to broker-dealers and
to other financial institutions that depend upon client and customer
relationships. From one perspective, Enron's fall is an example of the loss
of reputation, since the company had evolved into a financial institution,
and since the unethical and illegal behavior of its employees caused a loss
69
of confidence in Enron among its shareholders and counterparties. Other
examples from the past come to mind, such as Salomon Brothers from a
scandal involving sales of U.S. government securities, or Drexel Burnham
from scandals in the junk bond market.70 In a bubble environment, or in a
period of significant competitive pressures, concern about safeguarding the
financial firm from reputational risk may be swept aside as bankers
compete for deal flow and for the significant immediate wealth that comes
with it.7' Today, the risk may be even more acute because broker-dealers
66 See Ingo Walter, Reputational Risk and Conflicts of Interest in Banking and Finance:
The Evidence So Far 3-4 (N.Y.U., Leonard N. Stern Sch. of Bus., Dep't of Econ.,
Working Paper No. 06-27, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-952682.
67 See id. at 21 (giving the example of Citigroup's involvement in WorldCom, where
Citigroup favored the company over debt investors who purchased WorldCom debt
underwritten by Citigroup).
68 See id. at 24-25 (stating his belief that market discipline can best address reputational
risks).
69 Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., Conflicts of Interest and Corporate Governance Failures at
Universal Banks During the Stock Market Boom of the 1990s: The Cases of Enron and
WorldCom 10 (Geo. Wash. U. L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Stud. Research Paper, Working
Paper No. 234, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-952486.
70 See generally DANIEL FISCHEL, PAYBACK: THE CONSPIRACY TO DESTROY MICHAEL
MILKEN AND HIS FINANCIAL REVOLUTION (1995) (onjunk bond scandals).
71 See Alexander Ljungquist et al., Competing for Securities Underwriting Mandates:
Banking Relationships andAnalyst Recommendations, 61 J. FIN. 301, 303, 337 (2006)
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(and other financial institutions) for the most part are public companies, and
thus the loss of reputation can hit them from different sides, as it did with
Enron. And behind this risk is the ultimate nightmare of financial
regulators-systemic risk-which could well be occasioned by a
generalized public flight from the financial industry triggered by the demise
of one or two significant institutions.7 2
Since the abusive behavior of investment bankers, leading as it does
to reputational risk, runs counter to the long-term well-being of the
brokerage industry and of capital raising in general, their training, and that
of brokers and other participants in the financial industry and business, has
to change. This subject is too large for this essay, for it would involve
discussing the decline of professionalism in broker-dealers before the
explosion of financing activity in the 1980s.7 3 I would only observe that,
following the financial and corporate scandals, business school educators
became concerned (and some were convinced) that their training of
business school students contributed to the scandals. A very interesting
example in this regard is Michael C. Jensen, one of the most well-known
proponents of agency theory, who now advocates the importance of conduct
based upon "integrity" for financial firms and the markets, as opposed to
conduct based upon excessive self-interest."5 He means by this term an
organization (among other things) that is "whole, complete, and stable. 76
He offers as an example of a lack of integrity a company that knows that its
stock is overvalued, but issues it anyway in a merger. For him, this
transaction produces market instability because, while the present
stockholders may be content with the inflated value, the target's
shareholders will later be dissatisfied when they find that the merger
consideration is overvalued. In the IPO context, Jensen gives the example
of analysts colluding with managers to forecast long-term growth in the
firm's stock, only to have its long-term performance be substandard. 7' For
Jensen, this short-term deceptive opportunism makes the system of value
(contending that the competition from commercial banks in the bubble environment
upset the equilibrium in investment banking and led some banks and analysts to
sacrifice their reputation).72 See LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL
SERVICE ACTIVITIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 177 (2d ed. 2004) (quoting Frederic S.
Mishkin, Securing a safety net against economicfreefall, FIN. TIMES (London), June 6,
2000, at 2).
71 On this subject, see KNEE, supra note 24.
74 See, e.g., Sumantra Ghoshal, Bad Management Theories Are Destroying Good
Management Practices, 4 ACADEMY MGT. LEARNING & EDUCATION 75 (2005).
75 See Michael C. Jensen, Keynote Address at the meetings of the American Finance
Association: Putting Integrity Into Finance Theory and Practice: A Positive Approach
(Jan. 6, 2006) (Harvard NOM Research Paper No. 06-06 (2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-876312.
76 See id. at 5.
77 See id. at 44-46.
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creation unstable. 78 Integrity demands that parties work for the long-term
stability of the organization, the relationship, and the financial system.
According to Jensen, (and fellow Harvard Business School professor
Rakesh Khurana) business school students, who are future investment
bankers, hedge fund managers, and firm executives, need to be trained to
understand the importance of these pro-social norms in corporations and in
finance, in opposition to the current self-interested focus, in promoting the
"integrity" of firms and the financial marketplace.79
The financial world cannot wait for a new generation of investment
bankers and brokers trained to place importance on integrity in their
transactions and business relationships. As an additional pragmatic
solution, but one with a broader, less targeted purpose than many of the
reforms previously discussed, I would suggest using in the IPO area a
reform that financial companies adopted (or had imposed upon them
through settlements) after their involvement in corporate or financial
scandals: the formation of a senior transaction/client relationship review
committee. 8°  The purpose of this committee would be to review
transactions, such as IPOs, from the perspective of the reputation of the
financial institution itself, and of the long-term sustainability of the
institution and the financial industry, not from the self-interested positions
of the investment banker deal teams, or even the interest of the corporate
finance department or the yearly earnings of the financial institution.
Ideally, this committee, composed of senior executives from business
divisions, internal auditing, legal, and compliance functions, would try to
ensure that the firm does not enter into transactions or engage in practices
that could bring significant legal liability upon the institution and/or
threaten its reputation.81 One would hope that this committee, looking into
the IPO area, would have questioned and prohibited the massive IPO
underpricing that even reputable firms, which had formerly eschewed such
practices, fell into, as well as the related allocation abuses, such as sending
hot IPO shares to potential clients, and the disjunction between private and
public views of their analysts. All of these practices demonstrated a lack of
professionalism and integrity by the financial institution. If, moreover, the
78 See id. at 4 (in his view, over time and over the long run, the lack of integrity will
make the system unstable); see also Werner H. Erhard et al., Integrity: A Positive Model
that Incorporates the Normative Phenomena of Morality, Ethics, and Legality 52-53
(Harvard NOM Research Paper No. 06-11, revised July 29, 2007).
79 See Jensen, supra note 75, at 19.
80 1 have discussed this kind of committee in another context. See James A. Fanto,
Subtle Hazards Revisited: The Corruption of a Financial Holding Company by a
Corporate Client's Inner Circle, 70 BROOK. L. REv. 7 (2004).
81 For the workings of the committee, see interagency Statement on Sound Practices
Concerning Elevated Risk Complex Structured Finance Activities, 72 Fed. Reg. 1372,
1374 (Jan. 11, 2007).
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bulge bracket firms prohibit certain practices, is it really likely that their
competitive position will be undercut by unscrupulous upstarts in the
financial industry?
The committee should also take the long view of the broker-
dealer's role in the U.S. capital markets and in the markets themselves,
understanding that, if the markets are undermined by abusive IPO practices,
financial institutions themselves will likely not survive. To use another
analogy from global warming, this is the kind of long-term view that energy
and other companies may finally be taking, as opposed to their
understandable, but short-term, resistance to modification of the status quo.
Moreover, the professionalism, which has as its goal the promotion of
behavior that is not single-mindedly self-interested, can be developed and
supported by this committee so that it is adopted by all broker-dealer
employees, not simply research analysts. The committee should also be
regularly in contact with securities regulators, like the SEC and the NASD,
who can offer their views on market practices and market problems from a
perspective that is based upon the long-term stability of financial
institutions and the financial system. In order to make the committee
accountable, it should be required to provide an annual report of its
activities to the broker-dealer's shareholders and attach it to the broker-
dealer's annual proxy statement.
The obvious question is how successful can this committee be,
given the competitive pressures placed upon it. Will it be only window
dressing, or a place for bureaucratic wars involving divisions within the
broker-dealer? These possibilities stem from the tremendous pressure due
to the demands of profitability since the investment banks are public firms.
Profitability requires retaining top bankers and brokers, who these days are
always ready, with the slightest provocation, to move outside the banks to
competitors or the unregulated financial institutions, like hedge funds and
private equity firms . In addition, profitability may demand more trading
and proprietary profits, which means that the investment banks engage in
activities raising more potential conflicts with clients. An even more
difficult question is determining which ethical, moral or even political
economic foundation the bankers in the committee should base their work
upon. Professor Jensen is obviously struggling with this issue by offering
his notion of "integrity," because he is attempting to find a value that is
neutral (e.g., openness, commitment, willingness to correct misbehavior)
and is thus widely acceptable, without provoking debates about the
definition of ethically appropriate behavior.
82 A good example is what occurred at Citigroup. The head of wealth management,
Todd Thomson, allegedly ran up excessive expenses. The then CEO Charles Prince
told him to restrain his expenses, but was ignored. Thomson was released from the firm
and will probably end up managing money privately. See Monica Langley et al., In
Citigroup Ouster, A Battle Over Expenses, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2007, at Al.
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V. CONCLUSION
My contention in this essay has been straightforward. The specific
IPO abuses that surfaced during the market bubble in the late 1990s
involved the active participation of broker-dealers. These financial firms
orchestrated the abuses and enlisted the aid or acquiescence of other
participants in the process, chiefly the executives and major shareholders of
the IPO firms, as well as favored institutional investors. Pushed by the New
York Attorney General and ultimately Congress, the SEC and the SROs
have put an end to the abuses through prosecution and regulation, even if
the regulation has not entirely been finalized in SRO rules. Thus, the IPO
abuses are something of ancient history, although, as explained above, a
debate about the advantages of the U.S. system of price determination-
bookbuilding- as opposed to other alternatives, is ongoing.
My point is that the IPO abuses indicate a larger problem in broker-
dealers, which could be labeled as an excessive focus upon self-interest
within the firms, and an accompanying characteristic: the decline in
professionalism among broker-dealers. As discussed above, the IPO
reforms, while addressing specific abuses, may have exacerbated this
underlying problem because, although they reinforced the professionalism
of the research analyst, they did not do the same for the investment bankers
and the brokers. This shortcoming is understandable, since this kind of
professional reform would have to be wide-ranging and reach within the
business schools that produce the future broker-dealer professionals. After
pointing to work on such reform, I offer a short-term solution for broker-
dealers, which is for them to institute a transaction/relationship review
committee that has, as one of its purposes, the goal to guard against IPO
practices that would threaten the broker-dealer's reputation, and that is
designed to enhance the firm's professionalism. This is admittedly only a
stopgap measure. As long as broker-dealers continue to play a role in the
IPO process, only a renewed professionalism among them will likely curtail
future abuses.

